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 ABSTRACT  
 The present study tested how intergroup threat (high versus low) and social identity as 
a Muslim (salient versus non-salient) affected belief in conspiracy theories. Data 
among Indonesian Muslim students (N = 139) from this study demonstrated that 
intergroup threat and social identity salience interacted to influence belief in 
conspiracy theories. High intergroup threat triggered greater belief in conspiracy 
theories than low intergroup threat, more prominently in the condition in which 
participants’ Muslim identity was made salient. Collective angst also proved to 
mediate the effect of intergroup threat on the belief. However, in line with the 
prediction, evidence of this mediation effect of collective angst was only on the salient 
social identity condition. Discussions on these research findings build on both 
theoretical and practical implications. 
 
 RESUMEN   
 El presente estudio examinó cómo la amenaza intergrupal (alta versus baja) y la 
identidad social como musulmán (saliente versus no saliente), afecta la creencia en 
teorías de conspiración. Los datos entre los estudiantes Musulmanes de Indonesia en 
este estudio, (N = 139) mostraron que la amenaza intergrupal y la saliencia de la 
identidad social, interactúan para influenciar creencias en teorías de conspiración. La 
amenaza intergrupal alta produjo mayor creencia en teorías de conspiración en 
comparación con la amenaza intergrupal baja, esta condición se presentó de manera 
más prominente en los participantes en donde la identidad musulmana se hizo 
saliente. La angustia colectiva también contribuyo a mediar el efecto de la amenaza 
intergrupal en la creencia; no obstante, de acuerdo con la predicción, la evidencia de 
este efecto de mediación de la angustia colectiva fue sólo con la condición de 
identidad social saliente. Las discusiones sobre estos resultados de la investigación 
se basan en dos implicaciones teóricas y prácticas. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is now a well-documented literature on 
how multifarious personality characteristics shed light 
on people’s proclivity towards belief in conspiracy 
theories (see Swami, 2012 for the review). However, 
very little is known about the effect of situational 
factors on belief in conspiracy theories (but see van 
Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013). In the spirit to fill this 
gap, this study aimed at explaining the belief in 
conspiracy theories on the basis of two situational 
factors: intergroup threat and social identity salience. 
We also propose a group-based variable of collective 
angst as a mediator to provide an answer as to why 
intergroup threat and social identity salience may 
impact belief in conspiracy theories. The contextual 
background used to examine these situational 
determinants of the belief in conspiracy theories is 
terrorism in Indonesia, which is up to date and even 
timely a topic that becomes one of the Indonesian 
government’s serious concerns (Arnaz & Marhaenjati, 
2013).  
At an intergroup level, conspiracy theories 
imply categorization of an out-group and an in-group, 
wherein the out-group plays a role as the actors of 
the conspiracy theories whereas the in-group plays a 
role as the believers. In this perspective of intergroup 
relations, conspiracy theories depict the out-group as 
a collective enemy who aims at dominating the in-
group through hidden activities (Kofta & Sedek, 
2005).  The content of conspiracy beliefs is specific, 
in the form of framing an out-group as a dangerous, 
powerful, or deceptive adversary (Kofta, 1995). As 
contended by Sapountzis and Condor (2013), belief 
in conspiracy theories signifies a dualistic account of 
intergroup relations with which members of the in-
group are apt to ascribe any events to a direct design 
on the part of a powerful out-group.  In support of this 
notion, Imhoff and Bruder (2014) recently reported 
that participants’ belief in conspiracy theories related 
to their negative stereotyping against powerful out-
groups regarded as less likable and more 
threatening.  
Some studies have indeed uncovered that in-
group members are vulnerable to have negative 
stereotyping against out-group members more 
particularly in the condition in which the first deem the 
second as threatening their existence (e.g., 
Branscombe & Wann, 1992; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 
1992; Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000). This 
argumentation is in line with a meta-analysis study by 
Riek, Mania, and Gaertner (2006) reporting that 
intergroup threats gave rise to negative out-group 
attitudes. Stephan and Stephan (1996, 2000) 
differentiated realistic threat and symbolic threat. 
Realistic threat denotes a threat to the sustainability 
of in-group’s economic and political existence. 
Symbolic threat is a threat originating from perceived 
intergroup differences in norms, values, and beliefs.  
In-group members may perceive an out-group as 
posing a threat to socio-cultural identity if the 
worldviews of the out-group are different from those 
of the in-group.  
Prior empirical studies that have examined 
the role of intergroup threats in molding negative 
intergroup attitude in terms of belief in conspiracy 
theories are still relatively unexplored. However, 
Kofta, Sedek, and Slawuta (2011) pioneered the 
study on the role of intergroup threat in affecting the 
belief in conspiracy theories. They found that that a 
realistic threat portraying Jewish people as 
undermining Poland’s group power triggered the 
Polish participants to believe in theories that the Jews 
have conspired to dominate the world. In the context 
of Muslims in Islamic countries, some studies have 
revealed several factors that catalyze a realistic threat 
among people in these countries. These factors are a 
striking gap in terms of economic prosperity between 
the Western and Muslim countries, dominance of 
democracy as a secular political system worldwide, 
and a foreign policy perceived as against Muslim 
such as the occupation of Palestine by Israel, the 
U.S’ invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Castells, 
2011; Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Moghaddam, 2008; 
Putra & Sukabdi, 2013; Robison, Crenshaw & 
Jenkins, 2006). Among some Muslims in Indonesia, 
such Western political and economic dominance 
incinerates a sense of defeat, which provokes the 
belief that the West has conspired to debilitate Islam 
and Muslims (Azra, 2000; 2006, Khisbiyah, 2009; 
Solahuddin, 2013; Suciu, 2008).  
Some Muslims also perceive that Western 
countries represent a catalyst of modernization and 
globalization, which pose a symbolic threat signifying 
a form of neocolonialism that supplants Muslim’s 
religious and cultural identity (Esposito, 2000). As a 
result, some Muslims interpret modernization and 
globalization as an attempt to homogenize the world 
that undermines Islamic identity, which has aroused 
anxiety, suspicion, and opposition in the Islamic 
countries (Moten, 2005).  In support of this 
argumentation, Mashuri and Zaduqisti (2014) recently 
found that symbolic threat perceived by the 
Indonesian Muslim students amplified the impact of 
Islamic identification on the belief in Western people’s 
conspiracies to create terrorism in Indonesia. Guided 
by these lines of reasoning, through this study we 
expect that the combination of realistic threat and 
symbolic threat posed by Western countries leads 
some Indonesian Muslims to believe that the Western 
countries have conspired to provoke terrorism in 
Indonesia.  
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According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986), the level of identity salience qualifies 
the effect of group threat on intergroup attitudes and 
perceptions (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). 
Salient social identity than non-salient social identity 
makes people to become more curious and sensitive 
in responding to threat attributed to their group and 
motivates these people to act in ways to defend or 
promote their group (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, 
& Doosje, 1999). Identity salience refers to the 
definition of the self on the grounds of group 
membership shared with other people (Haslam, 
Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). To the extent that 
individuals have internalized group membership they 
belong as an important part of the self, identity 
salience leads them to think, feel, and act in terms of 
their membership in that group (Wohl & Branscombe, 
2008). Moreover, the more salient identity is the more 
likely it is that this identity will be enacted in a given 
situation. This probability of enacting a particular 
identity asserts identity salience and in turn this 
salience increases commitment to that identity 
(Vryan, Adler & Adler, 2003).   
Religion in general is of fundamental 
importance for people’s lives and religious groups in 
particular represent a significant, salient identity 
(Jones & McEwen, 2000; Peek, 2005; Verkuyten, 
2007). The reason is that religion signifies a social 
identity that provides believers with a more distinctive, 
sacred worldview and enduring group membership 
than other social group identities (Ysseldyk, 
Matheson & Anisman, 2010). Islam in this regard can 
be a very typical case given that this religion provides 
strict guidelines technically termed the Five Pillars of 
Islam, the guidelines of which tend to make Islam a 
salient identity for its believers (Verkuyten, 2007). 
Thus, the salience of people’s identity as a Muslim 
may play a key role in strengthening the 
consequence of intergroup threat on negative attitude 
in terms of Muslims’ belief that Western countries, 
which are perceived as a source of the threat, are 
accountable for instigating terrorism in Indonesia.  
Some studies have found that different kinds 
of intergroup threat elicit a number of negative 
emotions such as fear, disgust, guilt, and anger 
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Riek et al., 2006). In this 
study, we focus on the effect of intergroup threat on 
another negative emotion termed collective angst, 
denoting people’s emotional responses based on 
concern over the vitality of these people’s group 
future existence which is perceived in jeopardy (Wohl 
& Branscombe, 2008, 2009; Wohl, Giguère, 
Branscombe, & McVicar 2011; Wohl, Branscombe & 
Reysen, 2010). Recent research has confirmed that 
either a realistic threat in terms of group extinction 
(Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013) or a symbolic threat 
in terms of group cultural discontinuity (Jetten & 
Wohl, 2012) trigger collective angst.  Based on these 
findings, we thus argue that the more Muslims 
perceive the Western countries as realistically and 
symbolically threatening Islam the more they 
experience a feeling of collective angst toward the 
prospect of Islam.  
Supports for intergroup attitudes, policy, and 
actions that detrimentally affect other groups in part 
are attributable to people’s feeling of a collective 
angst originating from the perception that those 
groups are threatening these people’s own group 
(Wohl, Squires, & Caouette, 2012). Belief in 
conspiracy theories may also have a detrimental 
effect since it has the negative potential to instigate a 
collective action and riots, especially after the events 
that endanger the social order such as terrorist 
attacks, wars, and economic crises (van Prooijen, 
2012). This detrimental effect of belief in conspiracy 
theories, as discussed in the previous session, is 
attributable to the observation that the belief is 
inspirited by negative stereotyping and 
characterizations toward the suspected out-group 
(Kofta & Sedek, 2005). In the context of religious 
fundamentalism and extremism, belief in conspiracy 
theories is even characterized with demonization of 
the other groups believed to be the actors of the 
conspiracy (Donskis, 1998). Intergroup threat 
stemming from perception that power and values of 
another group are threatening those of the in-group 
may implicatively invoke in members of the in-group a 
feeling of collective angst and in turn, this feeling 
animates the belief that the first group has conspired 
to harm the latter group. Furthermore, within literature 
on Social Identity Theory of Group-Based Emotion 
(Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), the empirical 
findings have demonstrated that social identity 
salience enhances the link between people’s 
emotions toward an out-group and their tendency to 
think and act against this out-group. What we can 
infer from this rationale is that collective angst felt by 
Muslims may trigger this religious group’s belief in the 
West’s conspiracy theories to harm Islam. This effect 
of collective angst on belief in conspiracy theories is 
even more pronounced in conditions that enhance the 
salience of Muslims’ Islamic identity. Furthermore, 
McCoy and Major (2003) argued that an out-group 
perceived as threatening an in-group elicits members 
of the latter group’s negative emotions against those 
of the former group. These emotions ultimately 
contribute to increasing the in-group’s negative 
attitudes and behaviors against the out-group. 
Deriving from these rationales, we, therefore, argue 
that intergroup threat triggers Muslims’ collective 
angst, which then promotes this religious group’s 
belief in the West’s conspiracy theories. This role of 
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collective angst in mediating the effect of intergroup 
threat on belief in conspiracy theories, drawing on 
Identity Theory of Group-Based Emotion (Mackie et 
al., 2000), is stronger when Muslims’ Islamic identity 
is salient.  
 
2. HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY 
 
Based on theoretical rationales and empirical 
findings discussed above, we generated several 
hypotheses as the following:  
2.1 Hypothesis 1: Muslim participants in the high 
intergroup threat condition would demonstrate 
significantly higher degree of belief in conspiracy 
theories than those in the low intergroup threat 
condition. 
2.2 Hypothesis 2: Muslim participants in the high 
intergroup threat condition would report significantly 
higher degree of belief in conspiracy theories than 
those in the low intergroup threat condition, but this 
effect would hold only in the condition in which 
participants’ identity as a Muslim was made salient. 
2.3 Hypothesis 3: Collective angst would mediate 
the effect of intergroup threat on belief in conspiracy 
theories.  
2.4 Hypothesis 4: The more Muslim participants 
experienced a feeling of collective angst the more 
they would believe in the Western countries’ 
conspiracy to create terrorism in Indonesia, but this 
association would be more pronounced in the 
condition in which participants’ Muslim identity was 
made salient. 
2.5 Hypothesis 5: Collective angst would mediate 
the effect of intergroup threat on belief in conspiracy 
theories, but only when the participants’ social identity 
as a Muslim was made salient. 
 
3. METHOD 
 
3.1 Participants and design  
Participants were 139 Muslim students from 
the department of Islamic Education, STAIN 
Pekalongan, Indonesia (89 women, 42 men, 8 
participants did not mention their gender; Mage = 
19.85, SDage = 1.32) who took part in this study 
voluntarily, in exchange of no rewards. The design of 
this study was a 2 (Intergroup Threat: high versus 
low) by 2 (Social Identity Salience: salient versus 
non-salient) between-subjects. We randomly 
assigned participants to one of the four combined 
conditions: high Intergroup Threat and salient Social 
Identity (n = 31), high Intergroup Threat and non-
salient Social Identity (n = 36), low Intergroup Threat 
and salient Social Identity (n = 32), low Intergroup 
Threat and non-salient Social Identity (n = 40). 
 
3.2 Procedure and measures 
We administered this study in a classroom in 
which questionnaire containing all measures and 
manipulations was handed to participants. Measures 
were created on the basis of a 5-point Likert scale (1 
= Strongly Disagree – 5 = Strongly Agree) and by 
averaging the items.  The materials in this study have 
been previously confirmed as in accordance to ethical 
codes and standards stipulated by the Research 
Board of Islamic State University of Pekalongan 
(STAIN Pekalongan). On the front page of the 
questionnaire, we provided participants with informed 
consent in which participants were asked to indicate 
their agreement to participate in the study by affixing 
their signature. On the first part of the questionnaire, 
participants were asked to read and comprehend an 
article about the extent to which Western countries 
tend to and are predicted to politically and culturally 
threaten Islamic worlds. Fictitiously published in a 
top-ranked Indonesian newspaper, this article was to 
manipulate Intergroup Threat. In the high Intergroup 
Threat condition, the article described that the threat 
was on the rise over the last three decades, and was 
predicted to further increase in the future.  On the 
contrary, in the low Intergroup Threat condition, the 
threat as described in the article had decreased over 
the last three decades and was predicted to further 
decrease in the future. Following the article was a 
passage to manipulate Social Identity Salience (see 
Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 1998; Haslam et al., 1999). 
In the salient Social Identity condition, the passage 
was a verbal instruction in which participants were 
asked to write a brief essay describing the nature and 
importance of their identity as a Muslim, along with 
their past, present, and future activities that are 
related to their status as a Muslim. In the non-salient 
Social Identity condition, the essay described 
participants’ activities on a given day (a standard, 
neutral control prime).  
After those two manipulations, participants 
were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
agreed with five statements to measure Collective 
Angst, which was developed by the authors (e.g., “I 
am anxious that having advanced knowledge and 
technology, Western countries undoubtedly can take 
over and change the Identity of Islam”; “I believe that 
Western countries can debilitate the existence of 
Islamic Worlds”; “I feel that Western countries are a 
threat to the sustainability of the uniqueness and 
purity of Islamic Worlds”; α = .84; corrected item-total 
correlations ranged from .51 to .74). Then, 
participants were also asked to answer two questions 
to assess the effectiveness of Intergroup Threat 
manipulation (i.e., “The trend of Western countries in 
threatening the Identity of Islamic Worlds has 
continued to increase, from 1980 to 2020”; “It was 
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predicted that in the future, the Western countries will 
threaten the Identity of Islamic Worlds”; α = .82). 
Subsequently, participants were asked to answer two 
items to measure the credibility of the article to 
manipulate Intergroup Threat (. e., “The article about 
relationship between Western countries and Islamic 
Worlds written above can be trusted because it was 
based on a scientific research; “The article about 
relationship between Western countries and Islamic 
Worlds written above was indeed realistic”; α = .77).  
On the final part of the questionnaire, 
participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they believed in four statements to measure 
Belief in Conspiracy Theories, which was developed 
by the authors (e.g., “Terrorism in Indonesia thus far 
has been catalysed by the Western countries’ 
conspiracy to enervate the existence of Islamic 
Worlds”; “Terrorism in Indonesia was ignited by the 
creation of the Western countries’ intelligence”; α = 
.83; corrected item-total correlations ranged from .55 
to .79). Finally, participants were asked to fill out their 
demographic information, including age and gender. 
Upon finishing, participants were thanked and 
debriefed.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Manipulation Checks 
An analysis of General Linear Model (GLM), 
with Intergroup Threat (coded 1 for high, coded 0 for 
low) and Social Identity Salience (coded 1 for salient, 
coded 0 for non-salient) entered as fixed factors, 
revealed a significant main effect of Intergroup Threat 
on the participants’ agreement with statements that 
West countries tend to threaten Islamic Identity, B = -
1.61, t = -6.13, p < .001, η_p^2= .22. Participants’ 
agreement in the high Intergroup Threat condition (M 
= 3.85, SD = .88) was significantly higher than in the 
low Intergroup Threat condition (M = 2.16, SD = 
1.16), F(1, 136) = 91.98, p < .001, η_p^2= .40. 
Neither main effect of Social Identity Salience nor 
interaction effect of Intergroup Threat x Social Identity 
Salience were significant—for the main effect of 
Identity Salience, B = -.04, t = -.15, p = .88; for the 
interaction effect of Intergroup Threat x Identity 
Salience, B = -.18, t = -.51, p = .61. This result 
indicated that the passage or article to manipulate 
Intergroup Threat was effective. Finally, participants’ 
belief in statements that the first article to manipulate 
Intergroup Threat (M = 3.65, SD = .82) was scientific 
and realistic was significantly higher than the midpoint 
of 3, t(139) = 9.39, p < .001. This result means that 
the credibility of the article was satisfying.  
 
4.2 Preliminary Analyses 
Demographic variables of Gender (coded 1 
for male and 0 for female) had no significant effect on 
Belief in Conspiracy Theories. Both male (M = 3.57, 
SD = .81) and female (M = 3.54, SD= .81) 
participants reported the same degree of Belief in 
Conspiracy Theories, t(129) = .17, p = .86. Age also 
turned out to have no significant effect on the Belief, 
B = .07, t = 1.30, p = .20. These results implied that 
Gender and Age did not need to be controlled in the 
hypothesis-testing analyses.  
 
4.3 Primary Analyses 
A GLM analysis, wherein Intergroup Threat 
and Social Identity Salience were entered as fixed 
factors, also revealed expected main effect of 
Intergroup Threat on Belief in Conspiracy Theories, B 
= -.78, t = -3.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. In line with 
Hypothesis 1, participants’ Belief in Conspiracy 
Theories was significantly higher in the high 
Intergroup Threat condition (M = 3.78, SD = 3.77) 
than in the low Intergroup Threat condition (M = 3.31, 
SD = .79), F(1, 135) = 12.35, p = .001, ηp2 = .09. 
However, this main effect of Intergroup Threat on the 
Belief in Conspiracy Theories was qualified by the 
interaction between Intergroup Threat and Social 
Identity Salience, B = .62, t = 2.34, p = .02, ηp2 = .04. 
As shown in Figure 1, a simple slope analysis 
revealed that high Intergroup Threat (M = 3.93, SD = 
.70) triggered significantly higher degree of Belief in 
Conspiracy Theories than low Intergroup Threat (M = 
3.15, SD = .90), F(1, 61) = 14.61, p < .001, but this 
effect emerged only in the salient Social Identity 
condition. On the contrary, in the non-salient Social 
Identity condition, the degree of Belief in Conspiracy 
Theories in the high  Intergroup Threat condition (M = 
3.63, SD = .84) and in the low Intergroup Threat 
condition (M= 3.47, SD = .67) was statistically the 
same, F(1, 74) = .81, p = .37. This result therefore 
corroborated Hypothesis 2.  
To test the role of Collective Angst in 
mediating the effect of Intergroup Threat on Belief in 
Conspiracy Theories, we used Preacher and Hayes’ 
(2008) simple mediation procedure (SOBEL), by 
resampling the data 5000 times. Result showed that 
this mediating role of Collective Angst was indeed 
significant (booth indirect effect = .256, SE = .085, 
95% LLCI= =.090, 95% ULCI = .422, z = 3.02, p = 
.003), in support of Hypothesis 3.To examine the role 
of Social Identity Salience in moderating the effect of 
Collective Angst on Belief in Conspiracy Theories, we 
used Hayes and Matthes’ (2009) probing interaction 
procedure (MODPROB). The results (see Figure 2) 
revealed that among participants in the Salient 
Identity condition, Collective Angst was significantly 
related to Belief in Conspiracy Theories, b = .44, se = 
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.09, t = 4.77, p < .001, 95% LLCI = .26, 95% ULCI = 
.62.  However, among participants in the Non-Salient 
Identity condition, Collective Angst was unrelated to 
Belief in Conspiracy Theories, b = .17, se = .09, t = 
1.85, p = .07, 95% LLCI = -.02, 95% ULCI = .35.   
These findings overall corroborated Hypothesis 4.  
 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 2.  
 
 
Finally, to test Hypothesis 5, we conducted a 
moderated mediation analysis using a bootstrap 
procedure (Preacher and Hayes, 2008, Model 15), by 
resampling the data 5000 times. In line with the 
prediction, Collective Angst in the Salient Identity 
condition proved to significantly mediate the effect of 
Intergroup Threat on Belief in Conspiracy Theories 
(Salient Identity condition = 1, booth indirect effect = 
.33, SE = .12, 95% LLCI = .10, 95% ULCI = .59; see 
Figure 3b), but such mediation effect was not 
significant in the Non-Salient  Identity condition (Non-
salient Identity condition = 0, booth indirect effect = 
.17, SE = .14, 95% LLCI = -.10, 95% ULCI = .44; see 
Figure 3a).  
 
 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
Belief in conspiracy theories reflects paranoid 
thinking (Pipe, 1997; Robins & Post, 1997). In 
intergroup relations, paranoid thinking contributes to 
external group attribution error, which makes people 
blaming an out-group instead of their group to be 
responsible for problems they encounter (Kramer, 
1994). This rationale is in line with findings in some 
studies reporting that under threatening condition, 
people mistakenly evaluate the threatening out-group 
(Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Buidin, 2001).  This is 
also the case with blaming the Western countries, 
perceived as threatening the existence of Islam and 
Muslims, as perpetrators of terrorism in Indonesia. 
This belief in the West’s conspiracy theories is starkly 
contradictory to the fact that the Indonesian 
authorities have convinced the public, supported with 
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very transparent media coverage such as television, 
newspaper, internet, and radio, that it is indeed 
domestic Islamist radical groups that should be 
responsible for the terrorism (Sentana & Hariyanto, 
2013).  
 
Figura 3a. Low Identity Salience 
 
 
Figura 3b. High Identity Salience 
 
 
The role of social identity salience in 
structuring the effect of intergroup threat on belief in 
conspiracy theories as found in this study asserts the 
truism of Group Identity Moderator Model (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). As explained by Verkuyten (2009), this 
model posits that social identity and intergroup 
threats interact to predict attitudes toward out-groups. 
This model has an alternative, which is called Group 
Identity Reactions (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & 
Spears, 2001) contending that perceived out-group 
threats are an antecedent of social identity, and 
strong social identity in turn leads to negative out-
group attitudes.  A limitation of this study is that social 
identity is not also measured using a social 
identification scale, but only manipulated using an 
informational scenario or a vignette. Next studies 
thereby can measure social identification with 
Muslims after intergroup threat to verify the verity of 
such alternative model.   
Situational factors can be one of the 
determinants in activating the salience of Islam as a 
social identity. As reported by some studies, those 
factors that have ever made Muslim attain 
considerable prominence and salience as a social 
category are, among other things, the Rushdie Affair 
in 1988-89, the first Gulf war in 1991, and the 
September 11th, controversial Danish caricature of 
Prophet Muhammad (Ahmad & Evergeti, 2010; 
Hussain, 2007; Modood  & Ahmad, 2007; Peek, 
2005). All of these events in essence are not in favor 
of Muslims and thus threaten their existence, from 
which Muslims’ negative attitudes and stereotyping 
against Western countries eventually emerge 
(Murshed, 2010). In Indonesian context, the 
discourse that incidents such as the September 11th 
and the insulting Danish caricature of Prophet 
Muhammad signify Zionist conspiracies to harm Islam 
has gained its popularity among a growing segment 
of Indonesian Muslim population (Daniels, 2007). 
These situational factors may implicitly have a role in 
providing a plausible answer for why salient identity 
as a Muslim as found in this study led intergroup 
threat and collective angst to amplify belief in 
conspiracy theories. However, to make this 
alternative explanation to become more explicit, next 
studies thus can directly create a vignette or a 
message framing with which participants are 
reminded with such situational factors. The message 
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framing is then combined with salient Muslim identity 
to examine how this combination has a crucial role in 
augmenting the effect of intergroup threat and 
collective angst on belief in conspiracy theories.  
The finding in this study that intergroup threat 
significantly triggered collective angst and the belief in 
conspiracy theories is in line with Hofstadter’s (1966) 
argumentation. This scholar argued that the belief in 
conspiracy theories serves to regain people’s sense 
of order and predictability in coping with threatening 
social events. In this regard, belief in conspiracy 
theories can be very instrumental to regulate people’s 
distress in response to threatening social events, 
wherein people attribute the events to specific 
enemies rather than unmanageable factors or 
irregularities (Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keefer, 
2012; Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010). The 
Model of Compensatory Control (Kay, Whitson, 
Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009) also describes that belief 
in conspiracy theories can be functional to reinstall 
people’s sense of control over threatening events that 
evoke anxiety and discomfort. This mechanism of 
compensatory control implies that in dealing with 
threatening events, people can preserve their sense 
of order and controllability by believing that such 
events are attributable to conspiracies and even 
superstitions.  
To our knowledge, this study is the first to link 
collective angst to belief in conspiracy theories. 
Existing studies within collective angst literature tend 
to focus on how this emotion predicts various in-
group favoring attitudes and behaviors. These 
attitudes and behaviors include the desire to 
strengthen the in-group (Wohl et al., 2010), support 
for actions to protect in-group (Wohl et al., 2011), and 
forgiveness for in-group’s past transgressions (Wohl 
& Branscombe, 2009). However, some recent 
research has shifted the focus to attitudes towards 
the out-group.  In this new research direction, 
collective angst has been found to elicit unfavorable 
attitudes towards an out-group such as opposition to 
immigration (Jetten & Wohl, 2012) or decreased 
willingness to compromise with party in dispute 
(Halperin et al., 2013). The finding in this study that 
collective angst increases belief in the West’s 
conspiracy theories thus complements the new 
research direction in which collective angst turns out 
to be accountable for evoking negative out-group 
attitudes.  
Another limitation that deserves discussing is 
that this study involved only Javanese Muslim 
students as participants representing the majority 
ethnic group in Indonesia. As asserted by Jones 
(2002), among minority ethnic groups in Indonesian 
who are living in conflict areas, Indonesian national 
military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia: TNI) is believed 
as the true actor who provokes terrorism in Indonesia 
in an attempt to regain its role in government, which 
has been attenuated since the fall of Soeharto’s 
military regime in 1998. Thus, next studies need to 
address this point by recruiting respondents from 
multifarious minority ethnic groups in Indonesia.   
For the practical implications in this study, 
Indonesian government firstly requires being more 
concerned with implementing a counter strategy to 
reduce belief in conspiracy theories in the context of 
terrorism in Indonesia. In doing so, Indonesian 
government should conduct a comprehensive 
strategy by cooperating with other stakeholders. The 
reason is that a partial counter strategy, even 
conducted by experts, is no avail of attenuating belief 
in conspiracy theories since this belief is not easily 
falsifiable and implacable in nature (Newheiser, 
Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Sharp, 2008). Such 
implacable character of belief in conspiracy theories 
is also evidenced in the context of terrorism in 
Indonesia, in spite of successful Indonesian police in 
detaining and killing terrorists and a number of 
studies that proves that terrorist groups in Indonesia 
do exist (Singh, 2007). Secondly, the stakeholders 
with whom Indonesian government cooperates 
should be reliable ones. Belief in conspiracy theories 
is inspirited by a lack of trust (Goertzel, 1994); 
therefore, reduction of this belief should be done by 
reliable sources. The candidate will be Ulema as the 
assembly of scholars who have authorities on Islamic 
law in Indonesia.  The program of the belief reduction 
can be a campaign of counterevidence (e.g., 
Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011) to illuminate 
Indonesian Muslims regarding the real existence of 
domestic radical Islamist groups accountable for 
perpetrating terrorism in Indonesia. Although this 
recommendation seemingly sounds more political 
rather than scientific, but we argue that sciences, 
more particularly social sciences, sometimes should 
pay attention to typical socio-cultural characteristics 
within a society to make their applications 
reasonable. In this manner, Indonesia is one of the 
countries with high index of power distance, a cultural 
dimension that has to do with the extent to which 
society members agree that the power is distributed 
unequally (Hofstede, 2007). People in high power 
distance countries rely on the authorities to deal with 
societal problems (Farh, Hackett, & Liang, 2007). 
Drawing on these rationales, we suggest that the 
reduction of belief in the West’s conspiracy theories 
through the program of counterevidence conducted 
by Ulema as authoritative figures can be effective in 
Indonesian context.  
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